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Limited Liability Companies and the
Federal Securities Laws: Congress
Should Amend the Securities
Laws to Avoid Coverage
GEORGE A. BURKE, JR."
INTRODUCTION

The 1990s have witnessed a proliferation in the limited liability company ("LLC")
as a popular option for business organization.' As the twenty-first centurybegins, all
fifty states and the District of Columbia now have LLC statutes.' The rise in LLC
popularity derives from the benefits-such as limited liability, pass-through tax
treatment, relative freedom frommanagement and governance requirements, and ease
of creation-provided to organizers and investors when compared to traditional
corporations and partnerships.'
While the management structure of LLCs can be quite varied, the general
distinction is made between member-managed (members are vested with day-to-day
operating power) and manager-managed (managers are vested with day-to-day
operating power) LLCs.4 The type of management structure and the degree of
centralized management can have a direct effect on the pass-through tax status of an
LLC.5 However, the effect of different management arrangements on the status of

* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1992,
Vanderbilt University. I would like tothankProfessorHannah Buxbaumforhercomments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this Note. Iwould also like to thank my mother, Helen, and
brother, Michael, for their love and support. I would like to extend a special thank you to my
wife, Lea, for her constant love and encouragement. I dedicate this Note to Judge Sam Lewis
for giving me the inspiration to go to law school and to my daughter, Elizabeth Clarkson
Burke, born September 1,2000-you are my greatest accomplishment.
1. See David L. Cohen, Theoriesofthe Corporationandthe LimitedLiabilityCompany:
How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercingthe Veil, Fiduciary
ResponsibilityandSecuritiesRegulationfortheLimitedLiabiity
Company?,51 OKLA.L.REV.
427,447 (1998). For statistical data related to the growth ofLLCs, see Susan Pace Hamill, The
Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the CorporateIntegration Question, 95

MicH. L. REV. 393,440-46 (1996).

2. See Martha M.Canan, Check-the-Box Rules May IncreaseDisincorporationsGiven
FactThat 50 States Now Have LLC Statutes in Place, BNA CORP. COUNs. DAILY, Jan. 15,
1997, at D4.

3. Cohen, supra note 1, at 451-52; Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company
Membership InterestsShould Not Be Treatedas Securities andPossibleSteps to Encourage
This Result, 45 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1223, 1229-33 (1994); Park McGinty, The Limited Liability
Company: OpporuniyforSelectiveSecuritiesLawDeregulation,64 U. CIN. L.REv. 369,377
(1996).

4. McGinty, supra note 3, at 383. For a discussion of the varied management structures
of LLCs, see Goforth, supra note 3, at 1237-38.
5. LLCs specifically confer limited liability on members. McGinty, supra note 3, at 378.
Therefore, to avoid corporate taxation, an LLC "can ordinarily have no more than one of the
remaining three corporate attributes: continuity of life, free transferability of interests, or
centraliz[ed] . .. management." Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983).
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LLCs under the federal securities laws remains an open question.
Despite the advantages of the LLC entity, organizers and investors still face
uncertainty with respect to the coverage of the federal securities laws. " In fact, one
commentator has noted that "the proponents of LLCs generally have failed to predict
that the LLC might be considered a security by the [Securities and Exchange
Commission7 ] and be subject to [the federal securities laws]."' This Note explores the
issue of LLC interests as securities and concludes that congressional action is needed
to definitively exclude LLC interests from federal securities law coverage.
Part I of this Note looks at the current judicial analysis of the issue. This Part
begins with the traditional analysis under the securities laws andthe Supreme Court's
test for an investment contract as stated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.9 The subsequent
judicial interpretation oftheHowey testis also explored (with emphasis on the fourth
element). Next, the application of the investment-contract analysis to LLC interests
in recent federal cases is discussed. Finally, Part I discusses the problems with the
current judicial analysis and concludes that a more definitive approach is necessary.
Part II ofthis Note examines whether LLC interests shouldbe considered securities
and thus subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements and antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. The discussion focuses on the purpose of the securities
laws, the benefits of coverage to LLC investors, and the costs associated with finding
that LLC interests are securities. This Part concludes that LLC interests should not
be regarded as securities under the federal securities laws.
Part I examines alternative approaches to the issue of LLC interests as securities
with emphasis on two proposed approaches: (1)Professor Larry E. Ribstein's
intermediate-private-ordering approach ° and (2) Professor Park McGinty's
legislative-opt-out approach." By combining the strengths of each approach, Part Ill
argues that Congress should amend the securities laws to include a definitive
statement that LLC interests are not securities.
I. THE CURRENT JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF LLC INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
The Securities Act of 193312 ("Securities Act") defines a "security" as follows:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-

LLCs that are managed by members should normally lack centralized management, whereas
LLCs managed bymanagers would appearnormallyto have centralized management. McGinty,

supra note 3, at 383-84.
6. SeeinfraPart.B-C(discussing the current uncertainty regardingjudicial determination

of LLC interests as securities).
7. The Securities and Exchange Commission will be referred to hereafter as the "SEC"
or the "Commission."
8. Cohen, supra note I, at 464.

9. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
10. See LarryE. Ribstein, Formand Substancein theDefinitionofa "Security": The Case
ofLimited Liability Companies, 51 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 807 (1994).
11. See McGinty, supra note 3.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).

20011

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof),
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 3
The Supreme Court has stated that the definition of "security" in the Securities
Exchange Act of 193414 ("Exchange Act") is "virtually identical" to the definition in
the Securities Act"'5 Because of the general nature of some parts of the definition of
a"security" contained in the securities laws, the Supreme Court has articulated three
tests for analyzing securities: 6 (1) the Howey test for investment contracts, 7 (2) the
Landreth Timber test for stock, 8 and (3) the Reves test for notes.19
Certainly, all three tests are available for judicial analysis in determining whether
an LLC interest is a security. 2 Finding the most appropriate test requires a
comparison of the LLC to other business forms. An LLC is governed internally by
either an operating agreement decided upon by the members or the statutory default
rules of the state of organization. 21 By allowing the members of an LLC to alter the
default rules by an operating agreement between members, the LLC offers a flexible
management structure. An LLC is unlike a corporation because it is free from the
double taxation (if structured properly)' and restrictive governance requirements of
a corporation.' As a business entity, the LLC is a hybrid combining aspects of both
limited and general partnerships. The LLC offers the limited liability and passthrough tax status of a limited partnership without requiring the centralized
management of a limitedpartnership. 2 The LLC offers the option of member control

13. Id. § 77b(l).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
15. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967) (using cases construing the meaning
of "security" under the Securities Act to aid in determining the meaning of "security" under the
Exchange Act). There are a few minor differences between the Securities Act definition of a
"security" and the Exchange Act definition, but courts generally treat them as the same.
Goforth, supranote 3, at 1239-40 n.61.
16. McGinty, supra note 3, at 385.
17. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
18. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687, 690 (1985).
19. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,67 (1990).
20. For a detailed discussion of the application of the different tests for LLC interests, see
Goforth, supranote 3, at 1240-78 (analyzing LLC interests under the Landreth Timber test for
stock, the Reves test for notes, and the Howey test for investment contracts).
21. Id. at 1232. Most states' default rules designate management of the LLC by members.
McGinty, supranote 3, at 383.
22. See infra note 24.
23. McGinty, supra note 3, at 369.
24. The LLC offers flexible management options that include both member-managed and
manager-managed LLCs. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. However, "[tiax rules
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of management, making it resemble a general partnership (with limited liability for

members).
Thus, the relevant test for LLCs appears to be the Howey test for investment
contracts as it is applied to the business entities the LLC bids to replace: the limited
partnership and the general partnership.' In fact, most commentators, state courts,
and the SEC agree that the Howey test for limited and general partnerships will likely
serve as a touchstone for courts examining LLC interests.' The remainder of this Part
will examine the Howey test for investment contracts, its subsequent judicial
interpretation, its application in recent LLC cases, and the problems associated with
using this judicial test.
A. The Howey Testfor an Investment Contract
The Supreme Court explicitly defined the term "investment contract" as used in the
Securities Act in Howey as follows:
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits soley from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise
are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise.2
The Howey test can be divided into four elements: (1) investment of money, (2) in a
common enterprise, (3) expectation of profits, and (4) profits solely from the efforts
of others.'

ensure that LLC members generally will not delegate control to managers." Ribstein, supra
note 10, at 820. In order to maintain pass-through tax status, an LLC must not have more than
three ofthe following traits: continuity of life, limited liability, centralized management, or free
transferability of interests. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993). Because all
LLCs have limited liability, a centrally managed LLC would have to be sure that it lacks both
continuity of life and free transferability in order to be assured ofpass-through status. Ribstein,
supra note 10, at 821. Ribstein states that "most firms that want to combine centralized
management with limited liability and partnership tax treatment should organize as limited
partnerships... ." Id. He concludes by stating that "firms that choose the LLC form probably
are doing so precisely because of the differences between LLCs and limited partnerships
regarding member participation in control." Id.
25. McGinty, supra note 3, at 389.
26. Id. Regarding the Landreth Timbertest for stock, Professor Carol R. Goforth explains
that "[t]he Landreth Court specified that the test it enunciated applied to interests that were
labeled 'stock.' LLC membership interests are not called stock in any of the statutes." Goforth,
supra note 3, at 1247. She concludes that "[t]here is nothing in the language of either the '33
or '34 Acts to indicate that LLC membership interests should be treated as stock and subjected
to the broad analysis of the Landreth test." Id. at 1248. Regarding the Reves test for notes,
Goforth concludes that "since there is [the Howey test] available[,] which was designed to
apply to interests that do not fit a well-established pattern, it seems preferable to follow that
approach when attempting to analyze whether LLC membership interests will be securities."
Id. at 1270.
27. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,299 (1946).
28. Id.; Goforth, supra note 3, at 1274-76; McGinty, supra note 3, at 388-89.
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The first element of the Howey test requires an investment of money? In
InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. Daniel," the Supreme Court found that
this element is met ff "the purchaser gave up some tangible and definable
consideration in return for an interest that had substantially the characteristics of a
security."31 Given the likelihood that a membership interest in an LLC will provide
a member with some management control of the entity,32 it is extremely likely that an
LLC membership interest will only be exchanged for valuable consideration (either
cash or some other tangible consideration such as33property). Therefore, LLC interests
will likely meet this element of the Howey test
The second element of the Howey test requires a common enterprise.34 There are
two competing interpretations of the commonality element: (1) vertical commonality
and (2) horizontal commonality.35 Vertical commonality requires a common interest
between the investor and manager of the firm.36 Horizontal commonality is more
restrictive and requires a pooling of interests by members of the firm, meaning that
the members' interests must rise or fall together.3 Under vertical commonality, an
LLC would almost certainly pass this prong of the Howey test because both the
management and the members (whethermanager-managed ormember-managed) have
a common interest in the success ofthe enterprise.38 In the majority of LLCs, even the
more restrictive horizontal commonality requirement will be satisfied since there are
likely to be more than two or three members in most LLCs whose contributions to the
venture will be combined and whose fortunes will rise or fall together.39
The third element of the Howey test is the requirement ofan expectation ofprofit 40
Most LLC investors are likely to be seeking profits.' In addition, even such benefits
as tax advantages may satisfy this element.42 An investor is unlikely to invest in an

29. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
30. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
31. Id. at 560.
32. See supranote 24.
33. Goforth, supra note 3, at 1274. Goforth states that LLC interests are likely to be
acquired for valuable consideration regardless of how the LLC is organized or operated. Id.
34. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
35. Goforth, supra note 3, at 1274.
36. Id. Often a distinction is made between broad vertical commonality and strict vertical
commonality. Strict vertical commonality requires that the manager and the investors share the
risk ofthe venture, while broad vertical commonality simply requires a connection between the
efforts of the manager and the collective success (or loss) of the investors. See Theresa A.
Gabaldon, A Sense of a Security: An EmpiricalStudy, 25 J. Corp. L. 307, 338 (2000).
37. Goforth, supra note 3, at 1274.
38. A manager-managed LLC in which the manager is not a member and is compensated
independent of the success ofthe enterprise is theoretically possible.Id. However, this scenario
is unlikely because members are not likely to concede management control without some
incentive for a successful venture.
39. Id. at 1274-75.
40. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
41. Goforth, supra note 3, at 1275.
42. Id. at 1273; see SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459,464 (9th Cir. 1985)
("[Tihe prospect of tax benefits resulting from initial losses does not necessarily detract from
an expectation of profits."); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir.
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LLC without either an expectation of profit or the expectation of tax benefits from
the venture. Therefore, most, if not all, LLCs will meet the third element of Howey.
The fourth element of the Howey test-that the profits be "solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party"--is the most controversial element of the test."
Analysis of the fourth element of Howey represents the point of decision regarding
limited partnership interests and general partnership interests as securities. Likewise,
the fourth element is likely to be the deciding factor of whether an LLC interest is
considered a security under Howey. Because limited partnerships require centralized
management, interests in them are generally regarded as securities (because they
satisfy the elements of Howey, including the fourth element).45 In contrast, general
partnership interests are often presumed not to be securities because the fourth
element of Howey is not met.' Thus, if LLC interests are analogized to limited
partnership interests, then they will likely be found to be securities; if LLC interests
are analogized to general partnership interests, then they are less likely to be found
securities. 47
Even if LLC interests are analogized to general partnership interests, the
determination is not always clear. If the term "solely" is interpreted literally, then
most LLC interests (and also general partnership interests) would probably fail to
meet this element and be found not to be securities. As Goforth states:
A literal interpretation [of "solely"] would exclude interests in which the form of
the transaction offered a minute degree of theoretical involvement to investors,
even if the economic and practical realities of the situation were such that the
investors had no meaningful control over their investment and were forced to rely
on the expertise of others.'
However, the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,Inc. 9 held that
the proper interpretation of this element of Howey was to require proof that efforts
by someone other than the investor "are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."'
A majority of other circuits have adopted this approach.5 In addition, the Supreme

1982) (finding that the expectation-of-profit requirement was met even though the investment
was promoted primarily for tax benefits), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388,407-08 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding that the possibility
of tax losses does not compel a conclusion that investors did not have expectation of profits),
cert. denied,440 U.S. 939 (1979).
43. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
44. See Goforth,supranote 3, at 1273; McGinty, supranote 3, at 389; see alsoWilliamson
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,418 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the fourth factor is most litigated).
45. McGinty, supra note 3, at 390.
46. Id. at 391.
47. Id. at 389.
48. Goforth, supranote 3, at 1273. Even in manager-managed LLCs, the members, ifthey
do not already manage the LLC, may take over management duties at any time if they so
choose. McGinty, supra note 3, at 390.
49. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
50. Id. at 482.
51. Goforth, supranote 3, at 1273; see also SEC v. Prof'I Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th
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Court in UnitedHousingFoundationInc. v. Forman' omitted the word "solely" from
its rephrasing of the Howey test.'
In Williamson v. Tucker,' the Fifth Circuit developed an expanded interpretation
of the fourth element of the Howey test as applied to general partnerships. The court
stated that "the mere fact that an investment takes the form of a general partnership
orjoint venture does not inevitably insulate it from the reach of the federal securities
laws."' The court continued by enumerating three situations in which a general
partnership's interests may meet the fourth element of Howey and be deemed a
security:
A general partnership orjoint venture interest can be designated a security if the
investor can establish, for example, that (1) an agreement among the parties
leaves so little power in the hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement
in fact distributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is
incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the
partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the
enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.5 6
As a result of subsequent judicial interpretation, the meaning of the fourth element
of Howey, as applied to both LLC interests and general partnership interests, has
become much less certain than originally stated.
Because the first three elements of Howey are likely to be satisfied in the majority
of LLC interest cases, the focus of the judicial inquiry into whether LLC interests are
securities will most often be the fourth element of Howey--whether the profits are
from the efforts of others-and the subsequent judicial analysis interpreting the
fourth element. The judicial determination of whether LLC interests are securities
"is likely to depend on the extent to which members in the LLC are dependent on the
efforts of others for a return on their contributions." ' Thus, under current judicial
analysis, the degree of management control left to the members of the LLC by the
operating agreement or the default statutes of the state becomes the central issue in
determining the security status of LLC interests.

Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic
Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577,582 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.deniedsubnom. Hechtv. SEC, 459 U.S.
1086 (1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning
Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627
F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912,914-15 (8th
Cir. 1976); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473,483 (5th Cir. 1974).
52. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
53. Id. at 852. However, the Court expressly declined to state whether it adopted the Ninth
Circuit interpretation. Id. at 852 n.16.
54. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 422.
56. Id. at 424.
57. Goforth, supranote3, at 1274 ("[T]he [firstthree] elements ofthe Howeytest are likely
to be met in the vast majority of instances, regardless of the language employed in the state
LLC statute or any advance planning by members or their attorneys.").
58. Id.
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B. Recent CaselawApplying Howey to LLC Interests
In SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless LLC, 9 the court was required to determine
whether the LLC interests sold by the defendants were securities under the federal
securities laws. The court applied the Howey test to the LLC interests and held that
the interests were securities.' The first three factors of an investment contract were
easily satisfied in the case.6 The focus of the controversy in the case was the fourth
element-whether the profits were from the efforts of others.'
In this case, the defendant contended that the fourth element of the test was not met
because the members held the ultimate power in the LLC.6' However, the court
rejected this argument and found that the fourth element of Howey was met because
"the investors had little, if any, true input into the company."" The court engaged in
a fact-specific analysis of the LLC transaction to determine that the interests met the
definition of an investment contract and were therefore securities.
Another recent case involving the issue of LLC interests as securities under the
65
federal securities laws is SECv. Shreveport Wireless CableTelevision Partnership.
Although this case involved two partnership interests and one LLC interest, the court
treated the partnership and LLC interests as identical in its analysis.' The court
applied the Howey investment-contract test and found the only issue in controversy
to be whether the fourth element was met!6
In Shreveport Wireless, the court adopted the expansive Williamson interpretation

59. 991 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997).
60. Id. at 8-9.
61. Id. at 8. The court found that an investment of money had occurred and that there was
an expectation of profit. Id.The court also found both vertical and horizontal commonality and
therefore did not specifically address the issue of which type of commonality is sufficient to
find an investment contract. Id.
62. See id. at 8-9.
63. Id. at9 n.3.
64. Id. at 8. In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the expansive interpretation of
an investment contract as stated in Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 1981),
and SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). Parkersburg
Wireless, 991 F. Supp. at 9 n.3. The court noted:
Regardless of the general treatment of LLCs under the applicable state law, the
"ultimate power" over [the LLC] rested not with the geographically dispersed,
inexperienced, predominantlyretired ... investors, but with [management]. While
the investors theoreticallymayhave possessed aright to manage the affairs [ofthe
LLC] under the terms of the Operating Agreement, the inexperience and
geographic diversity of the 700-odd investors essentially precluded this from ever
coming to pass.
Id. For a discussion of Williamson and Glenn Turner,see supra Part I.A.
65. No. CIV.A.94-1781, 1998 WL 892948 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 1998).
66. Id. at *5 n.3 ('The Court will treat the [partnership and LLC interests] at issue as the
same kind of interest because the powers granted to the investors.., are the same.").
67. Id. at *4 ("The parties thus agree that whether the general partnership and limited
liability company interests in this case constitute 'investment contracts' ... turns on whether
the investors expected to earn profits from the efforts of others.").
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of the fourth element of an investment contract. 6 The court stated, "If... the
investor's profits after the time of sale are primarily dependant [sic] upon the
promoter's efforts, the investor should have the protection of the federal securities
laws." The court concluded that "there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to
what extent and as of what date the partners controlled the enterprise." 0
A final case involving LLC interests as securities under the federal securities laws
is Keith v. BlackDiamondAdvisors,Inc.71 As in the two previously discussed cases,

the court applied the Howey test for an investment contract to determine if the LLC
interest at issue was a security.72 The court determined that the first three elements of
an investment contract were easily met and found that "[t]he critical inquiry here
involves the fourth prong of Howey-whether [the investors] invested in [the LLC]
with the intention of deriving profit from the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of
others."
The court also accepted the Williamson interpretation of the fourth element of
Howey.7' However, the court concluded that the investor was not passive and that
therefore the LLC interests in question were not securities.75 As in the two previously
discussed cases, the court's determination required an analysis of the specific facts
in the case.
C. The Problemswith the CurrentJudicialAnalysis
ofLLC Interests as Securities

As discussed above, the current judicial analysis of LLC interests as securities
involves application of the Howey test for investment contracts and the subsequent

68. Id. at *5.The court stated:
A general partnership will be considered a security if the SEC is able to
"demonstrate that, in spite ofthe partnership form which the investment took, [the
investors were] so dependent on the promoter or on a third party that [they were]
in fact unable to exercise meaningful partnership powers."

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424).
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id.

71. 48 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
72. Id. at 332.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 333 ("In Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), the court
recognized that although general partnership interests, in contrast to limited partnership
interests, are ordinarily not securities because of the level of managerial control exercised by
a general partner, in some limited circumstances a general partnership interest may be a

'security.").
75. Id. at 334. The court stated:
[]f at the time of his investment in [the LLq, [the investor] did not intend to be
a passive investor, as he clearly did not, the [LLC] interests could not be
securities. Furthermore, although the degree of control he actually exercised was

less than he expected to exercise, that fact does not convert his interests into
securities.
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judicial interpretation of the definition of an investment contract.76 However, there
are two problems related to this method of analyzing whether LLC interests are
securities.
The first problem with the current judicial analysis is the inherent difficulty of
applying the fourth element of the Howey test to LLC interests." Ribstein divides the
difficulties into two types: (1) the determination ofthe degree ofinvestor involvement
in management and (2) the determination of "the expected impact of the investors'
efforts on the success of the enterprise."' 8
In order to determine the degree of investor involvement in management, the court
must evaluate, among other things, "the [investors'] explicit voting or management
rights, their 'background' right to participate in management under the [LLC] statute
to the extent that it is not specifically negated by the agreement, and their effective
veto power implicit in their ability to dissolve the firm at will."' 9 Ribstein concludes
that these determinations are likely to vary from case to case because LLCs are highly
customized arrangements." The recent cases discussed in Part I are evidence that
Ribstein's conclusion is accurate."
A court's evaluation of the expected impact of investors' efforts on the success of
the enterprise is equally difficult. Ribstein points out that in an LLC, "each owner
may have little power to cause the firm to take a particular action, but nevertheless
has the power to block actions" by the firm. The effect of such a veto power on the
firm's success may not be clear."3 In addition, "even when the members actively
participate in a management decision, it often will not be clear how much each
member's participation contributed to the fin's success.""
The inherent difficulty of applying the Howey analysis to LLC interests creates
uncertainty in regards to whether LLC interests are securities."S This uncertainty gives

76. See supra Part I.A-B. Specifically, the current judicial analysis usually involves the
application of the fourth element of an investment contract-that the profits be from the efforts
of others-and its subsequent judicial analysis. See supra Part I.B.
77. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 829.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. See supra Part I.B.
82. Ribstein, supranote 10, at 829.
83. Id.
84. Id. Ribstein offers a comparison to franchise transactions to demonstrate the difficulty
of such an inquiry. Id. at 829 n.74 ("The difficulty in determining each member's contribution
to the firm's success is similar to the issue in the franchise context in which the enterprise's
success turns on both the franchisee-investor's management of the outlet and the franchisorpromoter's management of the overall enterprise."); see, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City
Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646 (D. Colo. 1970) (concluding that the franchise interest at
issue in the case was not a security).
85. The discussion in Part I.B demonstrates that thejudicial outcome in LLC interests cases
can be varied. Of the three cases discussed in that section, one found that the LLC interest was
a security, SECv. Parkersburg Wireless LLC, 991 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1997), one found that
the LLC interests was not a security, Keith v. Black Diamond Advisors, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d
326, 332-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), and one found that there existed a material issue of fact and
denied a motion for summaryjudgment, SEC v. Shreveport Wireless Cable Television P'ship,
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rise to the second major problem with the current judicial analysis of LLC interests
as securities-the problem of increased litigation and compliance costs.
"The difficulty of applying the [Howey] test [to LLC interests] can make litigation
costly by multiplying the legal and factual issues that must be determined at trial.
Moreover, this difficulty can [also] increase the likelihood oflitigation."' 6 In addition,
"[b]ecause the outcome of the case maybe difficult to predict at the time of litigation,
....the probability of settling the suit prior to litigation" decreases.'
The uncertainty of the judicial analysis of LLC interests as securities also creates
significant compliance costs. McGinty states that the risks of securities law violations
often "force firms into costly compliance with securities regulation, even when they
eventually would be held not covered by the securities laws."8 McGinty concludes
"LLCs that take defensive securities law measures will have incurred significant
costs."89 In light of the uncertainty surrounding current judicial determinations of
LLC interests as securities, this Note will next consider whether LLC interests should
be considered securities under federal securities laws and whether there are
alternative approaches to the issue that would eliminate the uncertainty and its
associated costs.
II. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST LLC INTEREsTS AS SECURITIES

Several commentators have addressed the question ofwhether LLC interests should
be considered securities. Professor Elaine A. Welle has argued that LLC interests
should be considered securities based on traditional analysis and public policy.' On
the other hand, commentators such as Goforth, McGinty, and Ribstein have presented
arguments supporting the conclusion that LLC interests should not be considered
securities."' The debate involves two primary issues: (1) the purpose of the federal
securities laws and the benefits of securities law coverage and (2) the costs associated
with securities law coverage for LLC interests.
A. The Purposeof the FederalSecurities Laws and
the Benefits of SecuritiesLaw Coverage
for LLC Interests
In order to regulate the securities market, Congress has adopted several laws of
which the most important for the present discussion are the Securities Act and the

No. CIV.A.94-1781, 1998 WL 892948, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 1998).
86. Ribstein, supranote 10, at 829-30; see also McGinty, supra note 3, at 436 (discussing
the "extra litigation costs" associated with the current judicial analysis of LLC interests as
securities).
87. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 830; see also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis ofLegal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,265 (1974).
88. McGinty, supra note 3, at 426.
89. Id. at 436.
90. Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of
SecuritiesRegulation by PrivateAgreement,56 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 519, 532-86 (1999).
91. Goforth, supranote 3, at 1278-91; McGinty, supra note 3, at 423-36; Ribstein, supra
note 10, at 824-32.
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Exchange Act. Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act focus on mandatory
disclosure as the means of regulating the securities market.' In addition, each act
incorporates "specific anti-fraudprovisions designed to ensurethat all disclosures are
'
accurate and free of fraud."93
In SEC v. CapitalGains ResearchBureau,Inc.,' the Supreme Court stated that a

fundamental purpose of the securities laws is "to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
ofbusiness ethics in the securities industry."95 However, the purpose of the securities

laws is not simply mandatory disclosure for disclosure's sake. The ultimate purpose
of mandatory disclosure (and the Securities Act and the Exchange Act) is the
protection ofinvestors. 6 Therefore, the answer to whether LLC interests as securities
serves the purpose ofthe securities laws must focus on whether mandatory disclosure
concerning LLC interests would promote the protection of investors.
Generally, LLCs are "either privately negotiated transactions involving
management responsibilities or [are. marketed] to a relatively small number of
investors." In the case of member-managed LLCs, a new member will have the

power to participate in management of the entity.98 The management power of the
new member greatly reduces the need for mandatory disclosure." Any new investor
that is sophisticated enough to be attractive as a potential member-manager is unlikely
to invest without adequate disclosure, regardless of the scope of the federal securities
laws."° Thus, for member-managed LLCs, protection of the investor through the
federal securities laws appears unnecessary.
In the case of manager-managed LLCs, investors are more likely to be passive. 1 '
However, a broad, national marketing of LLC interests is not likely to occur because

92. Welle, supra note 90, at 534 ("From the beginning, the central focus of the federal
regulatory structure has been disclosure."); see Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d
893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977).
93. Goforth, supra note 3, at 1280. The most widely used antifraud provision ofthe federal
securities laws is section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which states that it is unlawful for any
person to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ...any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
94. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
95. Id. at 186 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933), quotedin Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 430 (1953)).
96. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967) ("One of [the securities laws'] central
purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of full disclosure .... ."); J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("[A]mong [the securities laws'] chief purposes is 'the
protection of investors' ....
");see also Goforth, supra note 3, at 1281 & n.230 (suggesting
disclosure is most important when securities are marketed to small, passive investors); Welle,
supranote 90, at 534.
97. Goforth, supra note 3, at 1281.
98. Id. at 1282.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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of the potential loss of partnership tax advantages." ° Therefore, both membermanaged andmanager-managed LLC investments are likelyto be privately negotiated
transactions targeted to small groups of potential investors.
In Marine Bank v. Weaver," the Supreme Court used the distinction between
publicly traded and privately negotiated instruments to find a transaction was not a
security."° The Court noted that "[tihe unusual instruments found to constitute
securities in prior cases involved offers to a number of potential investors, not a
private transaction as in this case."' 5 The Court concluded that "[tihe unique
agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the parties, is not a security."'" The Supreme
Court also distinguished publicly traded and privately negotiated transactions in
Reves v. Ernst & Young." 7 While the decisions in Weaver and Reves do not assure
that LLC interests are not securities under current judicial analysis,"S in these
decisions, the Supreme Court appears to accept the proposition that mandatory
disclosure may not be necessary to protect investors in privately negotiated
transactions.
Ordinarily, an investor negotiating a private transaction to invest in an LLC will
have sufficient bargaining power to demand the proper disclosure."l While the
argument canbe made that LLC interests could be marketed to a few unsophisticated
investors who lack the power to demand such disclosure, the likelihood that such an
investor would actually read and comprehend any mandatory disclosure information

102. Partnership interests that are traded publicly lose their pass-through tax advantage and
are taxed as corporations. See I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-2 C.B. 386-87. Likewise, LLC
interests that are publicly traded are likely to lose their pass-through tax advantage and
therefore are unlikely to be marketed broadly. See Goforth, supra note 3, at 1282 ("[I]t is
unlikely that [LLC] interests will be marketed broadly."); McGinty, supra note 3, at 425
("[Ml]ost LLC interests will be sold in private placements.").
103. 455 U.S. 551 (i982).

104. See id. at 559-60; McGinty, supra note 3, at 412; see also Dennis S. Kaijala,
Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Interpretationof Federal

SecuritiesLaw, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1473, 1509-10 (1986) (supporting the use of trading as a
relevant category for defining a security).
105. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559.

106. Id. at 560.
107. 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990) (concluding that the plan of distribution of a note is a valid
factor for determining if the note is a security); see McGinty, supra note 3, at 412.
108. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). In Ralston, the Supreme
Court suggested that an offer to only one offeree could constitute a public offering. Id. at 125.
McGinty points out that many transactions that are considered securities but are exempt from
registration are privately negotiated. McGinty, supranote 3, at 413.
109. Goforth, supranote 3, at 1281. Goforth explains:
When the transaction is negotiated privately, the potential participant will
normally have sufficient bargaining power to insist on being provided with
sufficient information. Similarly, participants who will have management rights
are less likely to need the protection ofnmandatory disclosure since they are likely
to be sophisticated enough to ask the right questions, and are in a position to
acquire sufficient information independent of federally mandated disclosures.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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is minuscule. 0 Thus, the mandatory disclosure required by the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act appears unnecessaryforboth member-managed and manager-managed
LLC interests.
Of course, the argument can be advanced that federal securities law protection is
needed for LLC interests to protect investors from fraud."' However, the commonlaw doctrine of fraud offers investors adequate protection from false or misleading
disclosure by LLC organizers. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[a]
representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or
believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or
qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation."'. Similarly, the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act provide that it is unlawful "to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made... not misleading."" 3 Thus, if disclosure is made by an
LLC, the investor is protected from fraud by the common-law doctrine of fraud." 4
However, if no disclosure is made by an LLC, the fraud provisions afforded by the
federal securities laws offer little added benefit to investors." Because mandatory
disclosure forLLC interests is unnecessary and the common-law-fraud remedy offers
investors adequate protection, the benefits of securities law coverage for LLC
interests are marginal at best.
B. The Costs ofFinding That LLC Interests Are Securities

Based on the above discussion, the protection offered by securities law coverage
for LLC interests does not appear tobe significant. Of course, even amarginalbenefit
to investors would be a rational reason for concluding LLC interests are securities,
ifthere are no additional costs associated with the determination. However, there are
substantial costs associated with extending securities law coverage to LLC
interests." 6
110. Id. at 1283 n.243.
11I. See Welle, supra note 90, at 546-52 (arguing that the antifraud provisions of the

securities laws are necessary to protect LLC investors).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977).

113. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2000).
114. McGinty correctly points out that even without mandatory disclosure, "[r]ealistically
... few firms will make absolutely no disclosure." McGinty, supra note 3, at 438. He goes on
to state that "[o]nce [an LLC] does disclose, the common law of fraud prohibits such firm from
omitting to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not
misleading." Id.

115. It is true that the sale of securities that are exempt from the mandatory disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws are covered by the antifraud provisions. See 17
C.F.1L § 240. lOb-5(c) (stating that the antifraud provisions of this rule apply to "the purchase
or sale of any security"). Such coverage appears to duplicate the protections of common-law
fraud. The question of whether the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws are
necessary in general is outside of the scope of this Note. However, the antifraud protections

afforded by the federal securities laws appear to be a weak argument in support of LLC

interests being considered securities under the federal securities laws.
116. The largest cost associated with LLC interests as securities is the cost of uncertainty
given the current judicial approach to the issue. See supra Part I.C.
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Goforth has considered the cost versus benefit question regarding LLC interests
and securities law coverage." 7 Goforth expresses the reality of mandatory disclosure
by stating that "[m]andatory disclosure includes direct costs such as the expense of
compiling and disseminating the required information together with the indirect costs
...that would occur when the formidable obstacle of mandatory disclosure leads to
the abandonment ofpotentiallyprofitable ventures."'" In additionto these regulatorycompliance costs, Goforth also notes that LLC interests as securities mayprohibit the
use of the cash method of accounting by such entities." 9 She concludes that these
costs outweigh the benefits of securities law coverage for LLC interests.2 Even
Welle, who argues that federal securities law protection is needed for LLC investors,
admits "securities regulation may have gone too far in attempting to protect investors
by imposing complicated,
costly, and sometimes burdensome regulations to achieve
its objectives.' ' 121
When the uncertainty of the current judicial analysis of LLC interests as securities
is also considered, the costs of securities law coverage (at least in its current
form-application of the investment-contract analysis) is even greater. As discussed
above, the uncertainty associated with the current judicial analysis raises both the
compliance and litigation costs of LLC transactions." I fact, the current judicial
approach to the issue "may impose significant costs by requiring an adjudicator to
make a difficult fact-specific inquiry in each case about the need for disclosure."'"
The regulatory-compliance costs along with the costs associated with the current
judicial analysis seem to outweigh the marginal benefits provided to LLC investors.
As discussed above, mandatory disclosure will provide little benefit to LLC investors
in a position to negotiate privately with the LLC promoter. In addition, mandatory
disclosure will not help the unsophisticated investor because such an investor is
unlikely to comprehend or use the disclosed information in an investment decision.
Finally, the antifraud protection of the federal securities laws offers the investor
similar protection to that already available from the common-law-fraud remedy.
Therefore, the logical conclusion is that LLC interests should not be considered
securities under the federal securities laws.

117. See Goforth, supra note 3, at 1285-88.
118. Id. at 1285.
119. Id. at 1286. Goforth notes that virtuallyallprofessional services enterprises usethe cash
method of accounting in order to take into consideration the fact that services are often
performed long before fees are received. Id. She concludes that losing the cash method of
accounting could have a "potentially disastrous [effect on] professional service LLCs." Id.
120. Id. at 1287-88 (concluding that "the federal securities laws should generally not be
applied to LLC membership interests because the potential benefits are so restricted and the
costs are likely to be high").
121. Welle, supra note 90, at 587. Welle goes on to admit that "the costs [of securities
regulation] may have exceeded the benefits." Id.
122. See supraPart I.C.
123. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 829.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 76:749

II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Given the inherent uncertainty of the current judicial analysis of LLC interests as
securities (an analysis that requires a fact-specific application of the investmentcontract test), perhaps a new approach is needed.Iu One possible approach is to
declare all LLC interests to be securities per se.125 This approach would eliminate
judicial uncertainty and would also lower some of the litigation costs associated with
LLC interests. However, this approach does not address the problem of regulatorycompliance costs. In addition, finding all LLC interests to be securities offers only
marginal
benefits to investors and does not serve the purpose of the federal securities
laws. 126
The first two sections of Part III will examine two alternative approaches that move
toward LLC interests being excluded from federal securities law coverage. By
combining aspects from both approaches, the final section will argue for
congressional amendment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to definitively
exclude LLC interests from the definition of a security in both acts.
A. The Intermediate-Private-Ordering
Approach
In Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of Limited
LiabilityCompanies,Ribstein argues that "[i]nsisting that the federal securities laws

be applied on a complex, fact-specific basis does not make sense in light of the high
adjudication and predictability costs of applying vague standards." 27 Therefore, he
proposes that courts allow parties to effectively waive federal securities law coverage
by selecting the LLC form." Ribstein calls this approach "intermediate private
ordering" and says that, under this approach, "courts could hold that the securities
laws do not apply when investors were led by the form of the transaction not to
expect protection.""'
Ribstein notes that most federal courts have held that there is a strong presumption
against characterizing general partnership interests as securities under Howey. 30 In

124. See supra Part 1.B-C (discussing the uncertainty of the current judicial analysis of LLC
interests as securities).
125. See Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company as a
Security, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1105, 1116 (1992).
126. See supra Part I.A (discussing the purpose of the federal securities laws and the
benefits offered to LLC investors by securities law coverage).
127. Ribstein, supranote 10, at 840-41.
128. See id. at 832. Ribstein urges that "courts should define 'security' with a view to the
appropriate tradeoff between the costs of determining and applying the rule,.on the one hand,
and congruence with policy objectives on the other." Id. at 831-32.
129. Id. at 812.
130. Id. at 813;seeWilliamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,424 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[Ain investor
who claims his general partnership or joint venture interest is an investment contract has a
difficult burden to overcome."). For cases applying a strongerpresumption against securitythat
can only be rebutted by evidence of the operating or management agreement, see Rivanna
Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1988);
Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 102-07 (3d Cir. 1984).
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effect, these courts have applied something like the intermediate-private-ordering
approach because they "rely heavily on the existence of a partnership relationship
3
rather than on the details of the partners' role" in management.'
' Ribstein suggests
32
that the same approach should be applied to LLC interests.
Ribstein's proposal addresses the problem of regulatory-compliance costs
associated with LLC interests as securities.' In addition, the intermediate-privateordering approach is consistent with the purpose of the securities laws.'34 However,
this approach leaves the question of whether LLC interests are securities in the hands
of the federal courts.
By leaving the ultimate decision with the federal courts, this approach does nothing
to alleviate the problem of uncertainty regarding the issue. In every area of law,
"policy preferences play an important role in predisposing courts to construe a
statute" narrowly or broadly.'35 McGinty points out, quite correctly, that "judges
deciding securities cases are motivated by a variety of visions of the common
good." 36 Expansionist judges are likely to find LLC interests to be securities under
Howey (and its subsequent liberal interpretation) regardless of the presumption
against security status.' 37 Therefore, although the intermediate-private-ordering
approach is theoretically sound, 3 " in practical terms, it offers little relief from the
costs and uncertainties caused by the current judicial analysis of LLC interests as
securities.
B. The Legislative-Opt-OutApproach
In The Limited Liability Company: Opportunityfor Selective Securities Law
Deregulation,McGinty proposes that "LLCs should be able to opt in or out of the
federal securities laws, provided that those that opt out clearly notify prospective
investors (i) that no protections of federal securities laws cover such interests and (ii)
what kind of disclosure they are making."'" Under this approach, LLCs will fall into

131. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 813.
132. See id. at 824. Ribstein justifies the extension of this approach to LLC interests based
on both the costs of securities regulation and the purpose of the securities laws. Id.
133. See id.; see also supra Part II.B (discussing the costs associated with finding LLC
interests to be securities).
134. See Ribstein, supranote 10, at 824 ("By facilitating contracting over disclosure rights,
emphasizing the form of the transaction tends to produce an optimal amount of disclosure.").
135. McGinty, supra note 3, at 434.
136. Id. at 435.
137. Id. at 434. McGinty states that "[j]udges are inclined to expand or restrict the concept
of 'security' on the basis of how they assess the relative costs and benefits of securities law
coverage." Id. McGinty explains that expansionist judges are often "willing to make the
tradeoff" between deterring fraud and the "economic costs ... produced by the reduction in
fraud." Id. Likewise, a conservative judge is likely to restrict the boundaries of the investmentcontract analysis based on a balance of economic costs and benefits. Id.
138. The intermediate-private-ordering approach istheoretically sound becauseit holds LLC
interests not to be securities. Thus, it both solves the compliance-cost problem and serves the
purpose of the securities laws. See generallysupra Part II (discussing the purpose of the
securities laws and the costs of finding LLC interests to be securities).
139. McGinty, supra note 3, at 437.
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three distinct categories: (1) LLCs that are SEC protected, (2) LLCs that voluntarily
disclose, and (3) LLCs that do not disclose." McGinty concludes that by "[g]iving
clear notice to investors, this regime would allow both LLCs and investors to reach
a more voluntary equilibrium overhow much disclosure and securities regulation they
141
want."
In order to accomplish this regime, McGinty suggests that Congress should amend
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to allow for LLC opt-out provisions. ' The
regime would further require that written notice of the opt-out decision be provided
3
in the LLCs articles of organization and on each certificate evidencing the interests."1
Finally, the opt-out regime proposes that "[t]o provide optimal notice, the
Commission could draft rules and regulations governing this minimal disclosure,
including what notice is required when the holder of an LLC interest sells it to
another."'"4
On the surface, the legislative-opt-out approach appears to eliminate the problem
of judicial uncertainty concerning LLC interest as securities. Because Congress
would be making the decision, it appears that courts would be left with little leeway.
However, McGinty's proposal suggests that the general definition of a security in the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act include "limited liability companies except
excluded LLC interests.""' This approach indicates a presumption that LLC interests
are securities unless specific exclusionary procedures are followed.
By creating this presumption, the legislative-opt-out approach appears to leave the
door open for expansionistjudges to find LLC interests are securities based on policy
decisions coupled with a determination that the notice of waiver was not sufficient.'"
In addition, the proposal would create several categories of LLC interests, depending
on their securities status and the amount of disclosure they are willing to give." The
multiple categories ofLLC interests can only add to investor and organizer confusion.
Thus, there is still a potential problem with substantial litigation costs in determining
whether the securities laws would in fact cover specific LLCs.
Another problem with the legislative-opt-out approach as suggested by McGinty
is that the regime appears to replace one costly regulatory scheme with a new,
untested regulatory scheme. By calling for the Commission to promulgate rules and

140. Id. at 440.
141. Id. at 437.
142. Id. Specifically, McGinty proposes that Congress add the following phrase to the
definition sections of the securities acts: "interests in limited liability companies other than
excluded LLC interests." Id. He also suggests that, in the general definitions sections, a new
term "excluded LLC interests" should be added to the definitions "so as to allow LLCs to
exclude themselves from coverage on the condition that they disclose that interests therein are
not covered or protected by federal or state securities laws." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see supranote 142.
146. McGintyrecognizes the problem ofjudicial expansion ofthe securities laws. See supra
notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
147. The potential categories include excluded and nonexcluded LLCs, along with different
categories for the level of disclosure that excluded LLCs are willing to give. See supra notes
139-44 and accompanying text.
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regulations governing the notice of waiver and notice of disclosure requirements,
McGinty's proposal does not substantially alleviate the compliance costs associated
with LLCs.11 The new regulatory system may in fact have smaller total compliance
costs because the disclosure required would be less than required under the current
securities laws. However, the costs of complying with the notice requirements
proposed by McGinty will certainlybe higher than no compliance costs (achieved if
LLCs are not considered securities). Therefore, the legislative-opt-out approach falls
short of the benefits provided if LLC interests are not considered securities."
C. A ProposedSolution: Definitive CongressionalAction
Excluding LLC Interestsfrom Coverage
by the SecuritiesLaws
A solution to the question of LLC interests as securities can be found by combining
the theory of the intermediate-private-ordering approach with the method of the
legislative-opt-out approach. The intermediate-private-ordering approach reduces
compliance costs and serves the purpose of the securities laws (protection of
investors)." 5 If the theory of the intermediate-private-ordering approach is
implemented using the legislative method of the opt-out approach, the result is a
practical solution to the problems of LLC interests as securities.
Thus, Congress should amend the Securities Act and the Exchange Act definitions
of security to definitively exclude LLC interests. A statement at the end of each
definition of "security" should state "interests in limited liability companies are not
securities within the definition of this act and are therefore not protected by the
provisions of this act."
This proposal solves the problem of regulatory-compliance costs because there is
no required disclosure with which LLC interests must comply. Moreover, litigation
costs are reduced because even expansionist judges could not disregard such strong
"plain meaning" in the statute. A precise, congressionally enacted amendment
excluding LLC interests from the securities laws would effectively remove the
decision fromthe discretion ofthejudiciary and thereby significantly reduce litigation
costs.
Furthermore, congressional exclusion of LLC interests would not affect investor
protection. Investors would still be protected from fraud by a common-law cause of
action for fraud.) This antifraud protection would extend to unsophisticated
investors that are contacted through general solicitations by LLC promoters."s Also,

148. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part II (concluding that LLC interests should be free of securities law
coverage based on the marginal benefits, high costs, and the purpose of the securities laws).
150. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
152. An unsophisticated investor would have a common-law-fraud claim if the disclosures
contained in the general solicitation materials were fraudulent. Also, the unsophisticated
investor is unlikely to use mandatory disclosure materials; therefore, mandatory disclosure
offers the unsophisticated investor no real protection. See supra note 109. This scenario is
unlikely because an LLC is most likely to be marketed to a relatively small number of investors
in a privately negotiated deal. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
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investors in LLC interests will likely have sufficient bargaining power to demand
adequate disclosure given the private nature of LLC transactions.5 3 Those investors
who lack the power can simply choose to invest in interests that offer federal
securities law protection."
CONCLUSION

This Note has attempted to analyze the issue of LLC interests as securities with a
view towards balancing the costs and benefits ofregulation while continuing to serve
the purpose of the federal securities laws. Although this Note proposes that LLCs
should be definitively excluded from securities law coverage, other more moderate
proposals are certainly available.' 55
However, there should be agreement about the need to remove the issue of LLC
interests as securities out of the realm of judicial interpretation. The Howey test for
an investment contract and its subsequent judicial interpretation simply do not offer
planners, organizers, or investors sufficient certainty concerning LLC interests as
securities. Although this Note has made an argument that LLC interests should not
be considered securities, any congressional action that will alleviate the uncertainty
regarding LLC interests is preferable to the current judicial analysis of the issue.

153. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
154. McGinty, supra note 3, at 440 ("Investors who really want disclosure and the other
significant securities regulations can still choose from the panoply of investments regulated by
the current system .... ).
155. Such proposals include McGinty's legislative-opt-out approach. See McGinty, supra
note 3.

